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ABSTRACT 
How AI is perceived by the public can have significant impact on 
how it is developed, deployed and regulated. Some commentators 
argue that perceptions are currently distorted or extreme. This pa-
per discusses the results of a nationally representative survey of 
the UK population on their perceptions of AI. The survey solicited 
responses to eight common narratives about AI (four optimistic, 
four pessimistic), plus views on what AI is, how likely it is to im-
pact in respondents’ lifetimes, and whether they can influence it. 
42% of respondents offered a plausible definition of AI, while 25% 
thought it meant robots. Of the narratives presented, those asso-
ciated with automation were best known, followed by the idea 
that AI would become more powerful than humans. Overall re-
sults showed that the most common visions of the impact of AI 
elicit significant anxiety. Only two of the eight narratives elicited 
more excitement than concern (AI making life easier, and extend-
ing life). Respondents felt they had no control over AI’s develop-
ment, citing the power of corporations or government, or versions 
of technological determinism. Negotiating the deployment of AI 
will require contending with these anxieties. 
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1  Introduction 
How developments in artificial intelligence are communicated 
to, and perceived by, the general public will critically influence 
the adoption and use of this technology [5]. It should therefore be 
a matter of concern that there is evidence to suggest that it is go-
ing wrong. In a recent report, the UK House of Lords argues that 
currently “many of the hopes and the fears presently associated 
with AI are out of kilter with reality” [19]. This view is shared by 
some foremost AI researchers, for example, Professor Margaret 
Boden: “AI’s future has been hyped since its inception. Overly en-
thusiastic predictions from (some) AI professionals have excited, 
and sometimes terrified, journalists and commentators” [4].  
Both excessively hopeful and excessively frightening narra-
tives can have significant negative societal impacts. Exaggerated 
expectations for what AI can achieve, and when, risk undermining 
further research and investment. Misplaced trust in AI technolo-
gies has already exposed people to a range of risks, including ma-
nipulation, privacy violation, and loss of autonomy [9]. Exagger-
ated fears, on the other hand, may lead to beneficial systems, such 
as better medical diagnoses, not being adopted. Both misplaced 
hopes or fears could lead to misguided regulation: for example, 
lack of regulation could encourage irresponsible use of AI; stifling 
overregulation could prevent the development and deployment of 
applications that would enhance the public good [11]. The public 
perception of AI is therefore an important ethical issue [15].  
Existing research has investigated levels of public awareness 
and understanding [1,23], or public perceptions [11] and views on 
risks and benefits of particular applications [3,14]. A third focus 
of research is public opinion on how these technologies should be 
shaped in future [10,20]. Some studies have represented a global 
perspective [2] and included several of the areas mentioned above. 
Building on this work, we set out to explore directly what the UK 
public believe AI is, and how much they subscribe to the kind of 
utopian and dystopian narratives mentioned above. 
In what follows, we explain our methodology in section 2 and 
the results in section 3; discussion is then in section 4; and recom-
mendations for next steps are in section 5, followed by a brief con-
clusion. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Sample 
To test the awareness of such narratives among the UK gen-
eral population, and the likelihood they attribute to these pro-
spects becoming reality, we conducted a quantitative online sur-
vey of 1078 respondents. Respondents were members of an online 
market research panel of over 20,000 members, selected to be rep-
resentative of the UK population in terms of geography and key 
demographics, managed by market research agency GfK on behalf 
of the BBC. All panel members were invited to complete the sur-
vey which included questions to identify the composition of the 
sample. Their responses were then weighted to provide a nation-
ally representative picture of UK society. In analysis, the data was 
cut by age group, gender and sociodemographic status. The soci-
odemographic groupings ABC1 and C2DE were used. ABC1 rep-
resents consumers in UK society with higher levels of educational 
qualification and higher income. C2DE represents consumers 
with lower income and lower levels of educational qualification 
[7].  
Our sample was typical of the UK population in terms of de-
vice ownership and attitudes towards technology [17], with 78% 
owning a smartphone, 70% owning a laptop, 65% owning a tablet, 
and 42% owning a desktop computer. 1% owned none of the de-
vices listed. Regarding the role that technology played in their 
lives, 39% felt that the statement “I can’t live without it but some-
times I do need a little break from it” most accurately described 
them. 1% felt that the statement “technology scares me” best rep-
resented them.  
2.2 Questions 
Respondents were asked a series of multiple choice and open 
text questions. The questions were presented to each respondent 
in a set order, one question at a time. Within each multiple-choice 
question, the range of possible answers was presented to each re-
spondent in a randomized order, to minimize the influence the or-
der could have on the results.   
The first two questions were used to gather data on the re-
spondents. The first question asked “Which of the following do 
you currently own?” and listed nine devices, from smartphone to 
virtual reality headset, and ‘none of the above’, as possible an-
swers. The second question asked respondents to select ‘which 
statement best represents the role technology plays in your life?’ 
The multiple-choice options ranged from ‘I can’t live without it’ 
to ‘technology scares me’. 
The remaining seven questions in the survey focused specifi-
cally on AI. Question 3 was “Have you ever heard of Artificial In-
telligence (AI)?’’. Those who answered ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ were 
not asked any further questions. Those who had heard of AI were 
asked question 4: “How would you describe Artificial Intelligence 
to a friend?” This was an open text response question, requiring 
respondents to explain in their own words or to opt out.   
Next, respondents were provided with a working definition of 
AI: “the development of computer systems able to perform tasks 
normally requiring human intelligence such as visual perception, 
speech recognition, decision-making and translation between lan-
guages.”  
This was followed by several questions where respondents 
were asked to evaluate eight claims about AI. These claims were 
drawn from a framework of hopes and fears that underlie much 
imaginative thinking about intelligent machines, as expounded in 
a recent article by Cave and Dihal [6]. Their article claims that 
Anglophone Western narratives about AI fall into four dichoto-
mies that each consist of a hope and a parallel fear. 
The four hopes, Immortality, Ease, Gratification, and Domi-
nance, are each associated with narratives in which intelligent ma-
chines affect society in a transformatively positive manner. Im-
mortality speaks to the basic drive to stay alive and healthy, and 
refers to how AI might be used in pursuit of this: for example, 
through personalised medicine and drug discovery. Ease refers to 
the desire to be free of drudgery, and the hope that AI will increas-
ingly perform many tasks that people do not want to do. Gratifi-
cation refers to the way one might wish to use that free time -- 
that is, pursuing whatever constitutes pleasurable activity – 
and the role AI could play in fulfilling these desires. Finally, Dom-
inance, or power over others, can be seen as the means to protect 
this blissful existence through AI contributing to powerful new 
means of defence and security. 
With each of these hopes, Cave and Dihal pair a parallel fear. 
Thus, the hope for Immortality contains the threat of Inhumanity: 
in the pursuit of an ever longer lifespan, a person risks losing their 
identity, becoming more machine than human. Ease threatens to 
become Obsolescence, as the desire to be free from work becomes 
the fear of being put out of work. Gratification carries the risk of 
Alienation when in their desire for artificially perfect interactions, 
humans become alienated from each other and prefer to interact 
with machines. And the pursuit of Dominance evokes fears of an 
Uprising, as a people’s own AI-enabled power turns on them. 
All participants were shown all 8 narratives, presented as in-
dependent scenarios and in a randomized order, to reduce any 
possible influence they may have on one another and on our re-
sults overall. The positive or negative was implicit in the scenario 
and left to the respondent to interpret. Question 5 asked whether 
respondents had heard of these narratives in the media or in con-
versation, and question 6 asked whether they felt concerned or 
excited by them. Question 7 asked whether they felt these state-
ments were likely to come true, and question 8 asked whether re-
spondents believed they would feel the impact of the narratives 
personally within their lifetime. Respondents who felt that none 
of the narratives would impact them within their lifetime were 
asked to specify why not in their own words. 
The following definitions were used to describe the eight 
hopes and fears: 
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Table 1: The eight hopes and fears.  
 
Immortality AI might revolutionise medicine, treat-
ment and drugs so that we could live for-
ever. 
Inhumanity AI might enhance our bodies so much that 
we become more machine than human. 
Ease AI might make our day-to-day lives easier 
because we could ask computers to do 
more tasks for us.  
Obsolescence AI might mean we become over reliant on 
machines and replace the need for humans 
in jobs, relationships and socialising. 
Gratification AI might become the perfect friend, there 
to listen whenever we need and ready to 
meet our every desire. 
Alienation AI might cater to all our desires so well that 
we prefer AI interaction to human interac-
tion. 
Dominance AI might help strengthen our military 
power because it could provide smarter 
weapons. 
Uprising AI might enable computers to become 
more powerful than us. 
 
Finally, all respondents were asked question 9: “To what extent do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘I feel I am 
able to influence how Artificial Intelligence (AI) develops in the 
future’” using a scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
Those who selected “disagree” or “strongly disagree” were asked 
a final question: to explain in their own words why they felt this 
way, or to choose “don’t know”. 
2.3 Limitations 
1078 respondents completed the survey. We were not always 
able to break down results by age or socioeconomic groups due to 
small sample sizes. Where we could, any notable variances have 
been stated in the sections below. Also, due to an oversight, there 
was some conflation of the definitions used for Obsolescence (“AI 
might mean we become over reliant on machines and replace the 
need for humans in jobs, relationships and socialising”) and Al-
ienation (“AI might cater to all our desires so well that we prefer 
AI interaction to human interaction”): Obsolescence was intended 
to refer primarily to the workplace (jobs) and Alienation to inter-
personal interactions (relationships and socialising). This might 
have obfuscated responses to these two. 
3. Results 
Results described are those with a p-value of 0.05 or higher. P-
value is used to demonstrate that a claim has a high probability of 
validity, rather than being the result of randomly occurring noise 
in the data. We use 0.05 as a threshold for the p-value indicating 
a 95% confidence in validity, or put another way, a less than 1 in 
20 chance of being ‘noise’ [21].   
3.1 Awareness of AI 
85% of respondents claimed to have heard of AI. 11% had not 
heard of it and 4% answered “don’t know”. Awareness was high 
across all age groups (varying between 79-90%).  
Verbatim analysis showed a range of levels of sophistication 
in defining AI. In response to the question “How would you de-
scribe Artificial Intelligence (AI) to a friend?”, which was an-
swered by 622 respondents, one respondent wrote: “Depends on 
the friend - I used to be a postdoctoral research fellow in the sub-
ject”. 42% of responses referred to computers performing tasks 
that replicated aspects of human cognition, such as “decision mak-
ing”, “learning” or “thinking”. 156 respondents, or 25% of re-
sponses, mentioned “robots”. 12% of respondents incorporated 
hopes or fears, such as “Computers doing things instead of people. 
I hate it,” or “scary robots” as featured in this article’s title. 
3.2 Awareness of Positive & Negative Narra-
tives 
When asked whether respondents had heard of the narratives 
in the media or in conversation, all of the narratives described 
generated some recognition among respondents. The most com-
monly recognised narratives were Obsolescence and Ease. The 
least well recognised narrative was Inhumanity with just 13% 
recognition.  
 
Table 2: Recognition of the hopes and fears narratives. 
 
Narrative Recognition 
Obsolescence 55% 
Ease 53% 
Uprising 44% 
Dominance 30% 
Alienation 20% 
Immortality 19% 
Gratification 16% 
Inhumanity 13% 
None of the above 6% 
 
As far as possible, we examined the composition of respond-
ents who were aware of each narrative: 
Immortality: More respondents aged 55+ were aware of this 
narrative (23.1%) than younger groups, with only 15.4% of 35-54s 
aware. The sample for 16-34s was too low to be robust. More men 
(22.0%) were aware of this narrative than women (14.9%). Differ-
ences between socioeconomic groups were not statistically signif-
icant.  
Ease: Significantly more respondents aged 55+ were aware of 
this narrative than any other age group (57.3% 55+ vs. 51.1% 16-34 
and 49.3% 35-54). Fewer respondents of sociodemographic group 
C2DE were aware of this narrative (47.9% C2DE vs. 56.2% ABC1). 
Gender differences were not significant.  
Dominance: More men (36.9%) were aware of this narrative 
than women (22.8%). More respondents aged 55+ were aware 
(32.6%) than 35-54s (23.0%). Differences between socioeconomic 
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groups were not significant. The sample of 16-34s for this question 
was too low to be robust.  
Uprising: More men (48.0%) were aware of this narrative than 
women (39.3%). Fewer C2DEs (38.7%) were aware of this narrative 
than ABC1s (47.1%). Age group differences were not significant.  
The differences in awareness for Inhumanity, Obsolescence, 
Gratification, and Alienation were not statistically significant.  
3.3 Emotional Responses to the Narratives 
Respondents were asked to rate how excited or concerned 
they felt about each narrative on a scale of 1-10, where 1 equalled 
concerned and 10 equalled excited. Only Ease and Immortality 
elicited more excitement than concern. Scores 1-3 are counted to-
wards the total percentage ‘concerned’, scores 8-10 are counted 
towards ‘excited’. 
For all six remaining narratives, respondents were more con-
cerned than excited. This therefore includes two narratives cate-
gorised above as hopes: Dominance and Gratification. The Obso-
lescence narrative elicited most concern.  
 
Table 3: Excitement and concern about the narratives. 
   
Narrative Excitement Concern Avg score  
Ease 29% 13% 7 
Immortality 25% 21% 7 
Inhumanity 8% 38% 4 
Uprising 7% 45% 3 
Alienation 8% 51% 4 
Gratification 11% 30% 6 
Dominance 17% 34% 5 
Obsolescence 8% 51% 3 
3.4 Perceived Likelihood of the Narratives 
Most respondents felt that four of the narratives were likely 
to come true: two hopes, Ease and Dominance, and two fears, Ob-
solescence and Uprising. For the four remaining narratives, more 
respondents felt that they were more unlikely to come true than 
likely to come true, although the responses were relatively evenly 
split. This question was also asked using a 10-point scale, with 
scores 1-3 counted towards the total percentage ‘unlikely to come 
true’, and 8-10 counted towards ‘likely to come true’. 
Respondents were asked a separate question on whether they 
believed each narrative would impact them personally within 
their lifetime. Where narratives were believed to be likely to come 
true, respondents believed this would happen within their life-
time. There was very little variation between age groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Respondents’ expectations with regard to the 
likelihood of narratives coming true. 
 
Narrative Likely Unlikely  
Ease 48% 5% 
Dominance 42% 7% 
Obsolescence 35% 12% 
Uprising 30% 16% 
Alienation 18% 25% 
Gratification 18% 26% 
Immortality 19% 28% 
Inhumanity 12% 30% 
 
Table 5. Respondents’ expectations with regard to 
whether the narratives would impact them personally 
within their lifetime. 
 
Narrative Impact in 
my life-
time 16-34 
Impact in 
my life-
time 35-54 
Impact in 
my life-
time 55+ 
Ease 53% 52% 58% 
Dominance 34% 30% 37% 
Obsolescence 33% 40% 37% 
Uprising 20% 23% 21% 
Alienation 12% 15% 10% 
Gratification 12% 14% 10% 
Immortality 14% 14% 13% 
Inhumanity 7% 9% 8% 
3.5 Perceived Influence on AI Development  
Across all narratives, 61.8% of respondents disagreed that they 
were able to influence how AI develops in the future. This disem-
powerment was not related to which narrative(s) the respondents 
were aware or unaware of. Respondents were asked to explain 
why they felt unable to influence the development of AI in an 
open text question; responses can be divided into three categories: 
1. Age. Many older respondents expressed the sentiment that 
their age prevented them both from having their views heard and 
from being affected by the technology in their lifetime: “Who is 
going to listen to an 80 year old? !!” One 58-year-old respondent 
wrote, “AI is being developed for the under-50s”. Age was also by 
far the most answer given (48% of 58 responses) for explaining 
why none of the eight narratives would apply to them within their 
lifetime; the oldest respondent providing this answer was 84, the 
youngest 58, with an average age of 72. 
2. Technological determinism. Respondents across all age 
ranges expressed the idea that the technology is going to develop 
regardless of attempts to change or inhibit it: “that shit’s out of 
the bottle now”. “Advances in technology will continuously hap-
pen regardless if it’s negative or positive.” 
3. Not being consulted. 29.6% of respondents stated that 
their views are neither solicited nor desired: “Who is going to ask 
me?” These comments often reflected a sense of dissatisfaction 
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about not being heard more generally: “How does the average per-
son influence the future at all”; “politicians and business never lis-
ten”. 
Several replies outlined who is perceived to be in control: 
1. Business. Several responses criticised big business: “com-
panies will go ahead regardless of what the individual thinks.” On 
the other hand, some respondents saw an opportunity to exert 
some influence through consumer behaviour: “consumers as a 
group may have an influence jointl [sic], by carefully choosing 
which AI products they buy”. 
2. Research. 30% expressed feeling disenfranchised by virtue 
of not having the technical expertise to understand and/or de-
velop AI: “People with more brain then [sic] I have will do the 
developing”. There was also a sense of feeling detached from an 
ivory tower elite: “When have scientists (and computer techni-
cians) ever listened to the public?” 
3. Government. There was a frequent expression of distrust 
of or detachment from politics: “AI will be influenced by Govern-
ment not man in street”. On the other hand, several respondents 
pointed out that government influence itself is limited: “Our gov-
ernments are too weak to reel in the maniacs creating Artificial 
Intelligence”. 
4 Discussion 
4.1 Do Non-Experts Have a Distorted Under-
standing of What AI Is? 
As noted above, nearly half of respondents gave a plausible 
definition of AI: one involving computers (or other artefacts) en-
gaging in cognitive feats (such as thinking or learning). This is 
beyond what we expected, perhaps reflecting growing awareness 
of AI in the general population. 
But this result is not incompatible with significant numbers of 
people holding fairly extreme views of what AI could do or cause: 
first, because it still leaves more than half of respondents with a 
less accurate picture of what AI is; and second, because broadly 
accurate ideas of AI as (a variant of) a thinking computer do not 
preclude holding extreme views about what those thinking ma-
chines might do.  
Of course, the extent to which any of the eight narratives used 
in the survey are ‘extreme’ or distortions depends on one’s stand-
point: expert views on the potential of AI vary widely [16]. But 
four of the narratives were couched in terms of thresholds (AI 
might allow us to live forever, or AI might become the perfect 
friend) that we would consider extreme. Although these scored 
lower than the narratives couched in terms of incremental change 
(AI might make our lives easier or strengthen our military), they 
all scored above 10% on both recognition and likelihood. 10% to 
20% of the population is a large number of people to have such 
utopian or dystopian views about an increasingly mainstream 
technology. 
Notably, 7.7% of respondents spontaneously expressed anxi-
ety in response to the request to provide an explanation of what 
AI is. Some elaborated on their fears (e.g., “must admit I find it a 
bit worrying, feel we might lose control of our lives if AI takes 
over”), but 36 responses to this question consisted of short and 
simple expressions of anxiety, such as “scary” or “creepy”. This 
goes beyond the data on the perceived likelihood of the negative 
narratives coming true: those responses suggest that people be-
lieve AI could go badly, whereas these open responses suggest that 
a significant minority see AI as inevitably or inherently bad.  
It is also noteworthy that 25% of respondents explained AI in 
terms of robots. We consider this a less accurate explanation than 
those that centred on thinking machines, as robots (i) are often 
not particularly intelligent, and (ii) are designed to act physically 
in the world (whereas AI need not). This conflation is understand-
able, partly because of the significant overlaps between the fields 
of robotics and AI, and partly because AI is frequently portrayed 
in film and fiction as embodied [5]. Nonetheless, it could be prob-
lematic. Imagining AI as embodied will lend itself to some narra-
tives more than others: it might, for example encourage the public 
to focus on worries of gun-toting killer robots rather than the real-
world challenge of algorithmic bias. Further, the gendering and 
racializing of humanoid embodied AI can perpetuate stereotypes 
[18]. 
Finally, 14 respondents mentioned fiction in their responses. 
All of the references to specific works were to films and TV series: 
AI: Artificial Intelligence (6), The Terminator (2), Star Trek (2), I, 
Robot (1), and Star Wars (1). This sample size is too small to draw 
valid conclusions; further work might explore whether such fic-
tional representations are influencing a broader segment of the 
public, and if so, whether they are doing so in ways that could be 
considered distorting or extreme. 
4.2 Pairs of Hopes and Fears 
As noted above, Cave and Dihal have previously posited that 
these narratives come as dichotomies; that is, pairs of hopes and 
fears. As also noted above, the survey did not present the narra-
tives in this way, yet these results do provide some evidence for 
this being perceived by respondents. First, awareness of the hope-
ful narratives is broadly similar to awareness of the fears with 
which they are posited to be paired (Obsolescence 55% and Ease 
53%; Uprising 44% and Dominance 30%; Alienation 20% and Grat-
ification 16%; Immortality 19% and Inhumanity 13%).  
Second, only two of the narratives elicit more excitement than 
concern (Ease and Immortality), and even in those cases, the pro-
portion of people excited is well below half (29% and 25% respec-
tively). It is particularly notable that two narratives that we have 
regarded as broadly positive -- Domination and Gratification -- 
are perceived to be significantly more concerning than exciting. 
At the same time, some (albeit relatively few) respondents ex-
pressed themselves to be excited about the negative narratives. 
These findings -- that awareness of the positive side of a di-
chotomy is in proportion with the negative side, and that feelings 
towards both the positive and negative sides are ambivalent -- 
suggest that, although the narratives as presented in the survey 
have attempted to pull apart the positive from the negative, there 
are limits to how much this is possible. This suggests that a sig-
nificant number of people recognize that there is an underlying 
scenario common to the positive and negative visions paired in a 
dichotomy (such as AI taking over more human jobs) and respond 
according to their predispositions, regardless of how it is framed. 
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In particular, it is notable that levels of concern are on average 
higher than levels of excitement, supporting Cave and Dihal’s 
claim that the hopeful narratives “contain inherent instabilities. 
The conditions required to fulfil each hope also make a dystopian 
future possible” [6].  
It is perhaps unsurprising that the Dominance narrative elic-
ited more concern than excitement. It is easy to imagine that pow-
erful new weapons create anxiety regardless of which country 
owns them. This might relate to the influence point above (see 
4.3): people might not identify with ‘their’ military, feel they don’t 
have control over their activity, or have ethical concerns about 
autonomous machines targeting and killing humans.  
That Gratification elicits more concern than excitement is 
more surprising. The definition we used (“AI might become the 
perfect friend, there to listen whenever we need and ready to meet 
our every desire”) was prima facie wholly positive. The negative 
reaction suggests that respondents are recognising behind the 
positive framing an underlying scenario which also has strong 
negative aspects, something suggested by some of the open text 
responses expressing anxiety about humans being replaced. It 
would be interesting to test this in other cultures: for example, 
both in Japan and in South Korea people are much more positive 
about seeing AI as a friend [5]. 
4.3 Perceived Influence on AI Development 
The findings show clearly that most people do not feel able to 
influence the future development of AI. In itself, it is perhaps un-
surprising that most individuals do not feel they can shape the 
direction of this large and highly technical industry. However, the 
verbatim responses to the question asking why they felt this way 
are revealing. While some cite a lack of technological expertise, 
others argue that those who are in control of this industry 
(whether corporations or governments) neither engage with nor 
care about the views of the ordinary public. This finding is con-
sistent with earlier research that has shown that people would be 
more likely to support AI applications if they were given more 
agency [3]. 
4.4 Differences Between Demographic Groups 
The survey revealed differences in awareness of several nar-
ratives based on socioeconomic status: ABC1 respondents were 
significantly more aware of the Ease and Uprising narratives. Lim-
ited awareness of the Uprising narratives among respondents 
with a lower socioeconomic status is surprising, considering the 
emphasis tabloids place on this narrative, frequently accompany-
ing even rather innocuous AI-related news items with pictures of 
the T-800 from the Terminator film franchise [5].  
There are also significant differences in awareness based on 
respondents’ gender: women were less aware of the Immortality, 
Dominance, and Uprising narratives. One potential explanation is 
that these narratives are very common in science fiction, which 
for the largest part of its history has been aimed explicitly at ado-
lescent male readers and viewers [12,22] 
 
5 Recommendations  
The results suggest many further avenues of work, including 
exploring the sources of these utopian and dystopian perceptions 
and the impact of alternative framings of AI. We suggest the fol-
lowing themes for further research:  
1. Sources of narratives.  
A deeper understanding of the hopes and fears for AI could be 
obtained through qualitative research investigating the sources of 
these ideas: which narratives have given individual respondents 
these perceptions? Such research might take the form of the 
‘What AI Researchers Read’ project, with non-experts rather than 
AI scientists being the subject of investigation [8]. 
2. Impact of alternative narratives.  
At the same time, further research could look into the impact 
of new, alternative narratives that are less extreme than the ones 
mentioned in this paper, or that emphasise aspects of AI outside 
these eight hopes and fears. Further research might test whether 
the frightening and overpowering image of AI could be mitigated 
by emphasising real, current applications, or narratives of control 
and involvement. It is worth investigating whether narratives that 
make their audiences imagine an active role in the development 
or deployment of AI can instil this sense of empowerment. 
3. Examining the ‘influence’ question.  
While this survey investigated whether people felt able to in-
fluence the development of AI in general, further research might 
investigate whether and how people feel they have control over 
the role AI plays in their personal lives, and which narratives 
might impact that. For instance, an important hypothesis to inves-
tigate is that the sense of disenfranchisement might stem from the 
portrayal of AI research. It has been previously shown that fic-
tional narratives about science tend to focus on individual scien-
tists [13]. Similar research focused on news media coverage 
should investigate the emphasis given to the role of big tech com-
panies, to see how they portray the role of the non-expert. 
4. Examining public perceptions of AI across cultures. 
This survey has examined the attitudes of a representative 
section of the UK population. These results should not be extrap-
olated globally: there is evidence to suggest that attitudes to AI 
vary between cultures and regions [5]. More research is needed to 
evaluate public perceptions of AI in other parts of the world. Such 
research could both explore recognition of these eight narratives 
(which, as noted above, were distilled from analysis of Anglo-
phone Western portrayals of AI), and develop further frame-
works.  
6 Conclusion  
This paper has explored a nationally representative survey of 
the UK population on their perceptions of AI, with a particular 
emphasis on sentiments regarding utopian or dystopian future 
scenarios. Overall, the findings show that this population have a 
markedly negative view of this technology: levels of concern were 
on average higher than levels of excitement across the narratives; 
concern was higher than excitement even for two ‘hopeful’ nar-
ratives; and 7.7% spontaneously offered negative sentiments in-
stead of explaining what AI is. Negotiating the deployment of AI 
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will therefore require contending with the fact that in some parts 
of the world, a majority of people see downsides even in ostensi-
bly utopian portrayals.  
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